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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
             
   v.
JAMES HOGELAND,
               Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No.  05-cr-00162)
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 12, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 24, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
2A jury convicted James Hogeland of possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  For the reasons that follow,
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only those facts necessary
to our decision.
In May 2004, the Philadelphia Police Narcotics Unit received information from a
confidential source that methamphetamine was being shipped via United Parcel Service
(UPS) to 6532 Torresdale Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Hogeland
resided.  When the package arrived at the UPS facility, the police subjected it to a dog
sniff, then later opened it pursuant to a warrant.  Inside they found four packages of
methamphetamine.  The package was then resealed and prepared for a controlled delivery
to the Torresdale address as soon as a warrant could be obtained.
An officer posing as a UPS delivery person made the delivery to Hogeland at the
Torresdale address, who signed for the package.  Minutes later, the police arrested
Hogeland outside his garage and searched his home, both pursuant to the warrant.  Inside,
police found numerous items, including knives, guns, bomb-making components, an
improvised explosive device, scales, a smaller quantity of methamphetamine, and
powdered ephedrine.  
Methamphetamine (actual) refers to the weight of the controlled substance itself,1
rather than the weight of the mixture containing methamphetamine as a whole.  See
USSG § 2D1.1.
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At trial, the Government called three expert witnesses to testify, including one
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and one from the
Philadelphia Bomb Squad.  The jury also heard testimony from a forensic chemist with
the Drug Enforcement Administration on the purity and net weight of the
methamphetamine (actual)  found at Hogeland’s address.1
After a three-day trial, the jury found Hogeland guilty on all eight counts, and the
District Court sentenced him to 600 months imprisonment.
II.
We exercise appellate jurisdiction over Hogeland’s claims of trial error under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we have jurisdiction to review the sentence imposed by the District
Court under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
A.
Hogeland first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
verdict convicting him of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine (actual) pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841.  We apply “a particularly
deferential standard of review . . . and will sustain the verdict if ‘any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).  
4Hogeland contends that, although the prosecution introduced evidence that he
possessed a mixture containing methamphetamine, it failed to establish that he possessed
with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine (actual).  He also
argues that evidence recovered from Hogeland’s home shows that he intended to cut the
methamphetamine mixture with ephedrine before distribution rather than refine the
mixture into pure methamphetamine.
Hogeland’s argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841.  The statute proscribes a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment
for possession with intent to distribute “50 grams or more of methamphetamine . . . or 500
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine.”  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).  Although Hogeland would have this
Court read the alternatives set out in the statute as mutually exclusive, both the plain
meaning of the statute and case law refute his argument.
Methamphetamine may be measured either by gross weight — including the
weight of the cutting agents — or by the net weight of the pure methamphetamine. 
Although we have never directly addressed this issue, two of our sister circuits have
found arguments similar to Hogeland’s unavailing.  In United States v. Stoner, 927 F.2d
45 (1st Cir. 1991), the First Circuit found that the defendant’s reading of § 841 as
applying only to sales of pure methamphetamine was not only inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the statute but also undermined its clear purpose because a clever drug
5trafficker need only add a pinch of baking soda to an otherwise pure bag of
methamphetamine to avoid the statute’s mandatory minimum sentence.  Id. at 46.  Also,
because almost all drug samples contain trace amount of impurities, the entire first
category in § 841 of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine would be rendered moot.  Id.
at 47.  This same argument was raised and rejected in United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d
868, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1992).
The Sentencing Guidelines are consistent with Stoner and Rusher.  Note (B) to
§ 2D1.1 explains that “[t]he term[]  . . . ‘Methamphetamine (actual)’ refer[s] to the weight
of the controlled substance, itself, contained in the mixture or substance . . . .  In the case
of a mixture or substance containing . . . methamphetamine, use the offense level
determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance, or the offense level
determined by the weight of the . . . methamphetamine (actual), whichever is greater.” 
In this case, when presented with evidence both that Hogeland possessed a
package containing 471 grams of a methamphetamine mixture and that the mixture was
73% pure, “‘any rational trier of fact could have found . . . beyond a reasonable doubt,’” 
Dent, 149 F.3d at 187 (citations omitted), that Hogeland possessed the requisite amount
of 50 grams methamphetamine (actual).  Thus, we will affirm Hogeland’s conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
B.
6Hogeland next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
verdict convicting him of possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime.  There are two components to this contention.  First, Hogeland argues
that there exists no reliable evidence that he possessed a destructive device.  Second, he
argues that there is no nexus between the device and the drug trafficking crime.  Because
Hogeland did not raise the issue of sufficiency of the evidence below, we review for plain
error.  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 62 (3d Cir. 2008).
Hogeland argues that the device was not a bomb and therefore he could not be
convicted of possessing a destructive device.  The evidence that Hogeland was in
possession of a destructive device, however, is compelling.  Two experts testified in great
detail as to the method of construction, composition, typical uses, and likely effects if
detonated of the device found in Hogeland’s home.  In particular, experts testified that the
device contained a fuse, match heads, an M-80-type explosive, explosive powder, and
ammunition inside a PVC sheathing.  Additionally, experts testified that the device was
ready to use at a moment’s notice; it needed only to be lit and hurled at a target.  From
this, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Hogeland was in possession of a
destructive device.
Hogeland’s contention that the link between the device and the drug trafficking
crime is too attenuated is also unconvincing.  The United States Code mandates specific
punishment for “any person who, . . . in furtherance of any such [drug trafficking] crime,
A destructive device qualifies as a “firearm” for purposes of § 924(c).  See 182
U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)-(4).
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possesses a firearm.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).   In United States v. Ceballos-Torres,2
218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held that “firearm possession that
furthers, advances, or helps forward the drug trafficking offense violates the statute.”  Id. 
However, “[u]nder § 924(c), the ‘mere presence’ of a gun is not enough.  ‘What is instead
required is evidence more specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her
possession actually furthered the drug trafficking offense.’”  United States v. Sparrow,
371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  Relevant factors in determining
whether the possession furthered the drug trafficking offense include the “accessibility of
the firearm, the type of the weapon, . . . proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time
and circumstances under which the gun is found.”  Id.  In Sparrow, this Court found that
the weapon was “strategically located” so as to be “immediately available” to the
defendant during drug transactions.  Id. at 854.  Similarly, in this case the destructive
device was located on a shelf in Hogeland’s home, near other weapons and close to drug
paraphernalia and the tools with which Hogeland would cut the methamphetamine to
resell.  We find these relevant factors more than sufficient to support the finding that the
device was to be used to further drug trafficking.
8For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm Hogeland’s conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime.
C.
Hogeland also argues that we should vacate his sentence because the District Court
erred in failing to subtract the methamphetamine intended for personal use, as indicated in
the presentence report, from the methamphetamine intended for distribution before
establishing the mandatory minimum penalty.  Again, because this objection was not
raised below, we review for plain error.  United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53
(3d Cir. 2002).
Hogeland maintains that our decision in Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237 (3d
Cir. 2004), required the District Court to determine and subtract the amount of
methamphetamine he intended to consume before calculating the amount intended for
distribution and applying the minimum penalty.  This argument is without merit.
In Jansen, we noted that the jury did not — nor was it required to — make a
special finding as to whether the drugs in that case had been possessed by the defendant
with the intent to distribute, and therefore the offense level was calculated by including
both the amount of cocaine he intended to distribute and the amount intended for personal
use.  Id.  Contrary to Jansen, in the present case the jury expressly found that Hogeland
had possessed at least 50 grams of methamphetamine (actual) with the intent to distribute
9that amount.  Even assuming, arguendo, that Hogeland’s reported personal use of one
gram per week were taken into account by setting aside years’ worth of
methamphetamine, Hogeland still possessed more than enough of the drug to satisfy the
50-gram requirement of § 841.  Accordingly, we find no error, and will affirm the
judgment of sentence imposed by the District Court.
D.
Finally, Hogeland argues that his counsel was ineffective for arguing that he was
guilty in direct opposition to his plea of not guilty.  This Court ordinarily does not review
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.  Such claims are more properly
reserved for collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see United States v.
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2003), except where the record establishes actual
ineffectiveness, see United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  This
condition is not met in Hogeland’s case.  Because Hogeland’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim requires an evidentiary finding of an absence of authority, a collateral
proceeding in District Court pursuant to § 2255 would be proper in this case.  Thus, we
will deny Hogeland’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without prejudice to his
right to raise this claim on a collateral attack brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
